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From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush,
Obama and the Reinvigoration of
America’s Soft Power
Ellen Hallams
“To all the other peoples and governments who
are watching today…know…that we are ready to
lead once more.”
• Barack Obama1
1 The election of Barack Obama in November 2008 appeared to signal a rejuvenation of soft
power ideas first articulated in the early 1990s by former Clinton official Joseph Nye.
Obama rejected his predecessors crusading tone and style, seeking instead to reposition
America firmly back into the exemplary tradition of US exceptionalism. He projected an
image of the United States as a country that seeks to lead by example, viewing America as
one  nation  amongst  many,  aware  of  the  limitations  to  US  power  and  pledging  to
reinvigorate  America’s  soft  power.  This  paper  seeks  to  examine  the  rhetorical
revitalization of this concept in the Obama Administration’s early foreign policy and asks
whether the debate over hard and soft power has now become outdated, given the Obama
administration’s emerging emphasis on “smart power” and the challenges of providing
national security in a dangerous and unstable world. Despite promising a sharp break
from the Bush Administration, Obama has found himself constrained by the realities of
the international system; a deeply ingrained mistrust of the United States, resistance to
US  power,  and  the  rise  of  emerging  power  centres  have  all  served  to  expose  the
challenges  of  translating  rhetoric  into  reality.  The  paper  concludes  by  arguing  that
Obama’s idealism and soft power instincts often conflict with the pragmatism that is at
the heart of the President’s approach to foreign policy, and what is often perceived as the
malevolent nature of America’s global power, but that he should be credited for putting
soft power at the centre of US foreign policy, and demonstrating a genuine – if sometimes
imperfect – commitment to leading by example.
 
From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America’s So...
European journal of American studies, Vol 6, No 1 | 2011
1
I. Soft Power: Anatomy of an Idea
2 In 1990, Joseph S. Nye Jr, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs in which he argued that with
the end of the Cold War concepts of power in world politics were changing with less
emphasis on military power, and more on technology, education and economic growth.
The critical problem facing the US at the end of the Cold War, Nye argued, was not how to
control resources -  a traditional barometer of global power -  but how to control the
political environment by influencing others. Nye identified five principal trends in world
politics at the end of the Cold War: economic interdependence; a growth in transnational
actors;  nationalism in  weak  states;  the  spread  of  technology;  and  changing  political
issues. Such trends meant that the reliance on traditional concepts of power were no
longer relevant and that a more attractive option for the United States would be to set
the agenda in world politics by getting other nations to want to follow the United States,
in contrast to ordering other states to do what the US wanted it to do.2 Implicit in Nye’s
argument, however, was the assumption that US power was, by its nature, inherently
benign,  that  other  nations  would  want  to  ‘follow’  the  US  because  of  the  sheer
attractiveness of its values, culture and beliefs. This co-optive or “soft” power, as Nye
coined the term, was further explored in Nye’s later study, The Paradox of American Power, 
which located it firmly in the wider framework of the “Information Age.” Nye argued that
although soft, or co-optive, power was not new – the US having harnessed it during the
Cold War through its role in creating international institutions, fostering cultural and
academic exchanges, and public diplomacy – the changes in world politics with the end of
the Cold War had made it more important.3
3 As Nye noted,  the leveraging of  America’s soft  power during the Cold War had been
overshadowed by its continuing reliance on hard power;  by the end of the Cold War
President Eisenhower’s warnings about the pervasive influence of the Military-Industrial
Complex had become a reality.  Even as the Cold War ended, expectations of a “peace
divided” proved unfounded with the 1991 Gulf War demonstrating to America’s friends
and  foes  alike  its  overwhelming  conventional  military  superiority,  while  crises  in
Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans resulted in the deployment of US military forces. Indeed,
between 1989-1999 the US undertook 48 open military interventions, compared to just 16
during the Cold War.4 By the end of the 20th century America had seemingly fallen in love
with  military  power,  with  what  C.  Wright  Mills  termed  a  ‘military  metaphysics,’  a
tendency  to  view  all  international  problems  through  a  military  lens.  For  Andrew
Bacevich,  the  respected US political  scientist  and Vietnam veteran,  the  very  idea  of
America has become inextricably interwoven with notions of militarism, what he defines
as a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure
of  national  greatness,  and  outsized  expectations  regarding  the  efficacy  of  military
force.Bacevich  argues  that  since  WWII  the  United  States  has  become  a  nation  of
“Wilsonians  under  arms,”  committed  to exporting  American  values  of  liberty  and
democracy by military means, thereby corrupting the benign ideals of Wilson for whom
war was simply a temporary measure, and not a permanent expression of the nation’s
character.5
4 Wilson is a figure who casts a long shadow over US foreign policy but as John Thompson
points out, Wilsonianism is itself a contested concept.6 Seen by some as the torchbearer of
a  benign  liberal  order,  others  see  in  Wilson  one  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  a  Pax
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Americana,  someone  who  saw  the  East  as  a  region  ‘to  be  opened  and  transformed
whether we will it or not; the standards of the West are to be imposed on it…’7 The debate
over the nature of Wilsonianism will surely continue, but it is important because it lies at
the heart of claims made by Nye and others of the benign nature of US power. For Nye,
the universal values espoused by Wilson are the heartbeat of America’s soft power, a
powerful and compelling magnet pulling other countries into its orbit. Nye, like Bacevich,
saw US Cold War policies as driven by hard power, but unlike Bacevich, Nye believed that
an increasingly chaotic and unstable post-Cold War environment was characterized by
two  forces  that  would  diminish  the  utility  of  hard  power:  globalization  and
interdependence.  What  Nye  successfully  captured  in  1990  was  the  changing  context
within which US policymakers had to operate and the challenges they faced. Flows of
information via the Internet meant governments were losing control over information
flows within their borders, while American values and interests were increasingly “sold”
around the globe through Hollywood, CNN and MTV. In an increasingly interdependent
world, the US had an opportunity to use its culture, values and policies to attract others
and generate  support  for  its  goals  and aspirations,  and to  shape  others  preferences
through leading by example. In focusing attention on the role of ideas, values and culture,
Nye made a seminal contribution to the debate over US foreign policy and offered a
welcome corrective to a debate dominated by Realist discourse,  with its emphasis on
states, power and military force.  However, what Nye underestimated was the degree to
which the dissemination of American values and interests on a global scale would be
viewed by  some as  the  ‘dark  side’  of  globalization,  setting  up  a  perilous  dichotomy
between what Benjamin Barber termed ‘Jihad vs McWorld.’ For Barber, the  advancement
of “one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce,”
had only served to fuel resentment over America’s seemingly imperious reach.8 This is
not to say that US culture and values are universally opposed in the Middle East and other
parts  of  the  world.  Very  often  it  is  US  policies  and  actions  that  are  the  source  of
discontent, but as Barber rightly notes, the exporting of US values and culture have not
been universally welcomed.
5 Nye’s concept of soft power did not take hold as a new paradigm for US foreign policy in
the post-Cold War era, becoming instead the source of much debate – and criticism –
within academia and policy circles. Nye’s influence was nevertheless perceptible during
the Clinton years, not least because he served as Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Despite  lacking  foreign  policy  experience,  Clinton  was  a  president  who  intuitively
grasped the changed context  of  the post-Cold War era,  and the challenges posed by
globalization  and  interdependence.  Clinton  understood  that  the  boundaries  between
foreign and domestic policy were becoming blurred, and sought to place the promotion of
American values firmly at the centre of US foreign policy, based on the ‘Wilsonian’ belief
that  promoting  democracy  and  liberalism  would  foster  a  more  stable  and  peaceful
international order. Nye made a close link between the successful projection of America’s
soft power and multilateralism: the more the US worked with its partners and allies and
through international  institutions,  the more support  and legitimacy it  would garner.
Madeleine  Albright  appeared  to  embody  this  approach,  articulating  an  “assertive
multilateralism” that saw the US working through and with the UN in humanitarian
operations in Somalia and Haiti, and with its NATO allies in the Balkans. The problem for
the Clinton Administration was that it found multilateral endeavors 
6 more complicated in practice than in principle. 
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7 As the US engaged in operations in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia, it became embroiled in
increasingly bitter disputes with the UN, NATO and European allies, leading the Clinton
Administration to revert to what it described as “multilateral when we can, unilateral
when we must.” This ambivalence towards multilateral  engagement was also coupled
with a growing disregard for international law and treaties by a Republican-controlled
Congress highly skeptical  of  soft  power approaches.  In Clinton’s second-term, the US
Congress sought to rein in Clinton’s multilateral tendencies wherever possible, believing
in  America’s  inalienable  right  to  “  go  it  alone”  in  world  affairs,  unconstrained  by
international institutions. Critics of soft power in the 1990s alleged that foreign policy
was not a popularity contest; Charles Krauthammer emerged as the foremost proponent
of a “new unilateralism” that would find its true voice with the coming to power of
George W. Bush and the neo-conservatives. The ingrained exceptionalist discourse that
infused  US  foreign  policy  in  the  1990s  often  sent  confusing  and  mixed  messages  to
America’s international allies. At times, the Clinton Administration appeared committed
multilateralists  and  soft  power  advocates;  at  others,  they  appeared  to  revert  to
unilateralist tendencies and exceptionalist beliefs about America as the “indispensable
nation.” Moreover, as Bacevich notes by the 1990s it was the US military that had become
a “compelling affirmation of American exceptionalism.”9 The leaking of the Pentagon’s
1992 Defense Planning Guidance blueprint for US global hegemony fuelled notions of a
Pax Americana, sentiments further bolstered by statements emanating from prominent
conservatives. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the House
Armed Services Committee that he wanted the US to be the ‘bully on the block’, in 1999
Condoleezza Rice claimed the world only had room for one hegemon and in 2000, General
Henry Shelton referred to the US military as the ‘new centurions.’10
8 As America headed for the 21st century, there seemed little appetite for the projection of
soft power. Public diplomacy – a vital component of US soft power during the Cold War –
was not accorded a high priority by the Clinton Administration with the US Information
Agency eventually folded into the State Department. Moreover. alhough Nye had been
right  to  argue  that  soft  power  played  an  important  role  in  the  Cold  War,  through
programmes such as the Marshall  Plan or the Voice of America,  the exporting of US
values and ideals found a ready market in Western Europe and Japan, and offered an
appealing alternative to those suffering behind the Iron Curtain; in the post-Cold War era,
the aggressive exporting of US culture and values beyond Europe and Asia, into Africa
and  the  Middle  East,  was  not  universally  welcomed..  Although  Clinton  made
commendable efforts at fostering diplomacy and negotiation on issues such as Northern
Ireland,  the Middle East  peace process and North Korea,  all  too often America’s  soft
power was undermined by its policies, an ingrained tendency to resort to military force
and  unilateralism,  and  assumptions  of  US  superiority.  Efforts  to  foster  an  Israeli-
Palestinian peace were undercut  by the administration’s  evident  pro-Israeli  bias,  the
administration’s  commitment  to  democracy  promotion  undermined  by  support  for
authoritarian regimes, while its use of cruise missiles in Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan
fuelled anti-US sentiment, putting paid to any notion that America would retreat from its
militaristic tendencies.   This was an era then of  soft  power theories and hard power
realities; Cold War habits proved hard to shake, the “military metaphysics” that C. Wright
Mills had spoken of during the Cold War, seemingly still exerting a profound influence on
US policymakers.
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II. The Bush Administration and the ‘New
Exceptionalism’
9 If  the Clinton Administration had only half-heartedly embraced soft  power ideas and
approaches, then the Bush Administration appeared to decisively reject them. From the
outset, the Bush Administration made clear its preference both for unilateral actions and
a Realist-oriented view of America’s military power.  I
10 n calling for US troops to be withdrawn from the Balkans,  Bush made clear that  he
perceived the kinds of humanitarian intervention undertaken by Clinton in Somalia and
Bosnia to be detrimental to the more pressing goal of addressing the major strategic
threats to America’s interests, namely China and Russia.
11 9/11, however, unleashed the messianic ideals of the neoconservatives who sought to
aggressively export and promote American democracy. According to Lynch and Singh, in
their  compelling,  though controversial,  study  of  Bush’s  foreign  policy,  Bush  did  not
radically  depart  from the  US  foreign  policy  tradition.  There  was  no  “revolution”  in
American foreign policy; the Bush Doctrine – the set of ideas and the administration’s
world-view as set out in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and Bush’s West Point
speech – is  viewed by Lynch and Singh as fitting into,  rather than departing from a
foreign policy tradition that has long borne the hallmarks of unilateralism, the expansive
interpretation of presidential power and the promotion of American values.11 Moreover,
as Bacevich notes, Bush’s militaristic approach to the ‘War on Terror’ was anchored in a
deeply rooted tradition of militarism that had built up a steady momentum by 9/11 – to
the point where, he argues, it had dulled Americans capacity to think critically.12 Still, the
Bush administration’s preference for the blunt instrument of military force in delivering
regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq and its dismissive attitude towards allies and
international institutions represented a sharp deviation from the more tempered liberal
internationalism of the Clinton years. Suzanne Nossell claimed that ‘After September 11,
conservatives adopted the trappings of liberal internationalism, entangling the rhetoric
of human rights and democracy in a strategy of aggressive unilateralism. But the militant
imperiousness of the Bush administration is fundamentally inconsistent with the ideals
they claim to invoke.”13 Others, notably Tony Smith, argued that unlike his predecessor,
Bush  was  committed  to  not  just  liberal  internationalism,  but  liberal  internationalist
imperialism.14
12 At the heart of this liberal internationalist “imperialism” was America’s hard power. For
the Bush Administration, 9/11 provided the contextual framework for a new strategic
doctrine that was the manifestation of neoconservative thinking regarding the American
military stretching back more than a decade. The neoconservative desire to maintain
America’s global hegemony and military dominance, combined with Donald Rumsfeld’s
commitment to a “new way of war,” based on information technologies and precision
weapons,  ensured  that  there  was  little  sympathy  for  soft  power  ideas  in  the  Bush
Administration. Rumsfeld himself was famously ignorant of the concept. When asked for
his  thoughts  on  soft  power  at  an  army  conference  following  the  war  in  Iraq,  he
responded, “I don’t know what it means.”15 The result was an administration for whom
the art of persuading others to share America’s goals and values was subsumed by a
fervent belief in the power of the American military to bring about decisive change to the
Middle  East.  Indeed,  the problem with the Bush Doctrine was  not  its  articulation of
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democracy promotion per se, but the belief that this democratic project would be carried
out through the application of America’s overwhelming military superiority, with little
role for international organisations and allies, and a disregard for international law and
norms. Bush, like his predecessors, was fundamentally committed to notions of American
exceptionalism,  yet  there  also  seemed something distinctly  different  about  the  Bush
Administration’s “brand” of US exceptionalism. It was not just Bush’s stark depiction of
the world as divided into “good” and “evil,” nor his evident desire to light up the Middle
East with the flame of American democracy; rather, it was what Stanley Hoffman termed
a “new exceptionalism,” a strident belief that in a desire to promote what Bush termed a
“distinctly  American  internationalism,”  it  would  be  legitimate  to  act  outside  of
international laws and institutions when they threatened to constrain America’s freedom
of action. For Hoffman, the exceptionalism of the Bush Administration was “something
entirely new and particularly troubling,” in particular, the “bizarre…claim that the US
Constitution  allows  no  bowing  to  a  superior  law,  such  as  international  law,  and  no
transfer, pooling or delegation of sovereignty to any international organization.”16
13 The Bush Administration’s dismissive attitude to NATO and its rejection of allied offers of
help and support that followed the alliance’s invocation of its Article V guarantee took
many in NATO by surprise – and left many feeling bruised and battered by the “thanks
but no thanks” approach of Paul Wolfowitz and others, who were disinclined to work
with America’s allies.17 The Bush Administration’s disregard for the UN further served to
alienate key allies and made securing support from those same allies for reconstruction
and stabilisation operations in Afghanistan and Iraq much harder. Although the Bush
Administration did engage with the UN, it was evident that it was paying only lip-service
to  an  institution  that  Republicans  had  constantly  derided  through  the  1990s.  What
characterised the Bush Administration’s  approach to both NATO and the UN was an
arrogance that at times bordered on outright contempt. Only the day after 9/11, when
discussing the limits international law could place on America’s military response, Bush
commented to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, “I don’t care what the international
lawyer says, we are going to kick some ass.”18  Although such contempt was not always on
public display, Bush and his chief advisers made it abundantly clear they would not be
constrained by cumbersome alliances and ineffective institutions. 
 
III. ‘It is not whose army wins, but whose story wins’
14 The Bush Administration’s attitude towards the UN was indicative of the broader world-
view  held  by  many  neoconservatives  and  officials  within  the  administration  about
America’s  role  in  the  world.  By  their  own  admission,  the  neoconservatives  view
international treaties and conventions as seeking “to constrain and control American
power,”  and  international  organisations  as  an  illegitimate  encroachment  on  US
sovereignty.19 Such views set the Bush Administration apart from its predecessors. On 7
February, 2002, President Bush signed a secret order suspending the Geneva conventions.
 As Philippe Sands has documented, the administration’s line of reasoning was premised
upon the belief that it was engaged in an “extraordinary war” that transcended the usual
legal norms and laws.20  This was not a unanimous view. Secretary of State Colin Powell,
his lawyer Will Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers all believed
the Geneva conventions had to be applied. In a memo dated January 26, 2002, Powell
made the argument that suspending the Geneva conventions would have a “high cost in
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terms of negative international reaction…; [and] It will undermine public support among
critical allies.”21 Such views, however, were outnumbered by those who firmly believed
Geneva  should  not  apply,  including  Rumsfeld,  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defence  Paul
Wolfowitz,  Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy,  Douglas Feith,  Jim Haynes,  General
Counsel to Rumsfeld, David Addington, General Counsel to the Vice-President and Alberto
Gonzales, General Counsel to the President – otherwise known as the “War Council.” 10
months later,  on December 2,  2002, Rumsfeld signed the now infamous Action Memo
entitled Counter-Terrorism techniques that approved new and aggressive interrogation
techniques for use at the US detainment facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
15 The line of argument espoused by the “War Council” was part of a wider mindset popular
amongst senior Bush Administration officials and a number of neoconservatives. In 2002,
Robert Kagan, editor of the conservative Weekly Standard, argued that “the United States
naturally seeks a certain freedom of action to deal with the strategic dangers that it alone
has the means and sometimes the will to address.” Kagan cited Robert Cooper, a key
advisor to Tony Blair, who advanced the argument that while Europe might operate on
the basis of laws and cooperative security, when dealing with the world outside of Europe,
it may nevertheless be necessary to use force and act outside international law to deal
with those who regularly undermine it.  For Cooper, the challenge to the postmodern
world “is to get used to the idea of double standards … Among ourselves, we keep the law
but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.”22 In the
context of the War on Terror, the Bush Administration used this frame of thinking to
advance the argument that because the United States was facing a unique enemy that
operated according to the “laws of the jungle”, so the United States reserved the right to
also use the laws of the jungle,  unconstrained by international institutions,  laws and
norms.
16 The Bush Administration’s determination to work through what Dick Cheney termed the
“dark side” was flawed for two reasons. Firstly, it was counter-productive, undermining
America’s  efforts  to  fight  radical  Islamic  terrorism.  When a  CIA analyst  was  sent  to
Guantanamo to find out why the interrogations were not working, his central conclusion
was that “if we captured some people who weren’t terrorists when we got them, they are
now.”23 The US military’s  tactics and strategy on the ground in Iraq also fuelled the
insurgency that plunged the country into a maelstrom of violence and bloodshed. In April
2003,  the 82nd Airborne division shot a group of demonstrators who had gathered to
protest the presence of US forces, killing 17, and in another incident two days later, shot
three protestors.24 A year later, in March 2004, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
took over from the 82nd Airborne division, but following the ambush of a Blackwater
convoy that lead to the deaths of four contractors, Donald Rumsfeld ordered the storming
of Fallujah in a poorly planned and ill-conceived attack. MEF’s Commanding Officer Lt
Gen. James T. Conway – who had resisted calls for revenge – admitted that “When we
were told to attack Fallujah, I think we certainly increased the level of animosity that
existed.”25 The Battle for Fallujah prompted Sunni Arab members of the Iraqi Governing
Council to resign in protest, damaging US political credibility. The Bush Administration
also ordered a halt to operations, with US forces replaced by a “Fallujah brigade” that was
drawn from the local populace but which refused all cooperation with the US. US actions
also precipitated an influx of foreign jihadis which further fuelled the insurgency, and
gave  rise  to  the  Al  Anbar  Awakening  of  2005-2006.   In  April  2008,  in  testimony  to
Congress, General David Petraeus, architect of the Bush Administration’s surge strategy,
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conceded that US misconduct at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere “inflamed the insurgency and
damaged the credibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq, in the region, and around the world.”
26  
17 As polls indicated declining international support for the US,  academics and political
commentators engaged in heated debated over whether America’s declining international
credibility and legitimacy mattered. Francis Fukuyama, a former neoconservative who
opposed the Iraq War,  argued the Bush Administration had failed to understand the
adverse reaction its policies had generated, claiming 
Legitimacy  is  important  to  us  not  simply  because  we  want  to  feel  good  about
ourselves, but because it is useful. Other people will follow the American lead if
they believe that it is legitimate; if they do not, they will resist, complain, obstruct
or actively oppose what we do. In this respect, it matters not what we believe to be
legitimate, but rather what other people believe is legitimate.27  
18 Fukuyama captures  well  here the problem facing contemporary American power.  US
policymakers  have  a  tendency  to  assume  US  power  is  benign  and  that  US  global
leadership is actively desired by many around the world. Even Nye has conceded that “we
can…no longer assume … that global public opinion will buy into the American narrative.
We can no monger assume that the world out there so readily identities with our idea of
‘the good life’ as universally appealing.”28 But making broad generalisations about the
benign or malign nature of US power, soft or hard, is also problematic.  In some instances,
such as Bosnia or Kosovo for example, the projection of American hard power was seen as
vital in stemming gross violations of basic human rights. Despite this, others saw the US-
led NATO intervention as a violation of international  law, and one which caused the
unnecessary deaths of civilians.29 Over Iraq, opposition to the US-led war was widespread,
seen by many as further evidence of America’s imperial footprint, but viewed by others as
a necessary evil to rid the world of a despotic regime.30 Similarly, some aspects of US
culture are welcomed in Arab or African nations, whose societies remain torn between a
desire for modernity and traditional tribal and religious values. The point here is that
American power is  inherently  subjective,  with perceptions  of  it  as  benign or  malign
wholly  dependent  on the  different  interpretative  lenses  through which it  is  viewed.
Perceptions matter, however, and whilst there has been a tendency for successive US
administrations  to  disregard  how  others  view  American  power,  it  was  a  problem
particularly prevalent within the Bush administration. For many on the American Right,
America’s  sliding  popularity  ratings  in  Europe  and  other  parts  of  the  world  were
irrelevant; claims America had squandered its soft power and damaged its international
standing fell on deaf ears as champions of US primacy such as Charles Krauthammer only
strived  to  make  their  voices  even  louder,  deriding  those  soft  power  advocates  who
wanted to make America “not the arbiter of international events but a good and tame
international citizen.”31
19 While  Krauthammer  and  Fukuyama  squabbled  over  the  relative  merits  of  the
neoconservative agenda, the Bush Administration appeared to have understood some of
the consequences of neglecting America’s soft power. When Condoleezza Rice met the
unashamedly pro-American French President Nicolas Sarkozy after his election in 2007,
she asked him: “What can I do for you?” Sarkozy responded by saying: “Improve your
image in the world. It’s difficult when the country that is the most powerful, the most
successful…is  one  of  the  most  unpopular  countries  in  the  world.  It  presents
overwhelming problems for you and overwhelming problems for your allies.”32 Bush’s
second term in office did appear to herald a shift  to a more multilateral,  soft power
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approach, that saw the Bush Administration commit to the six-party talks with North
Korea, engage with its European allies over IAEA inspections in Iran, establish a more
cooperative relationship with NATO and triple foreign aid assistance to Africa. By 2005 it
also appeared that the Bush Administration was belatedly coming to realize Joseph Nye’s
claim that “In the information age, success depends not only on whose army wins, but
also on whose story wins.”33
20 The  administration  began  to  place  a  renewed  emphasis  on  public  diplomacy,  a  key
component of soft power much under-valued by Bush Administration hawks. In 2004, the
US established 2004 Radio Sawa, an Arabic-language radio network that sought to use a
blend of US and Arab pop music to reach out to Arab youth, and its TV equivalent, Al
Hurra. It was the appointment of Karen Hughes as Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs in 2005, however, that heralded the beginning of a concerted effort to
ensure a more prominent role for public diplomacy in the battle to win Arab “hearts and
minds.” In 2005 Bush admitted “We’re behind when it comes to selling our own story and
telling people the truth about America.”34 It was within this context that Hughes, and her
successor James Glassman, established a program called Public Diplomacy 2.0 that sought
to embrace social networking sites and other web tools to win the “war of ideas.” The
Bush  Administration’s  public  diplomacy  efforts  were  largely  ineffectual,  however,
because the administration continued to demonstrate a profound misunderstanding of
the  audiences  they  were  trying  to  reach,  engaging  in  a  “one-way,  message-driven
information assault on the Arab and Islamic world.”35 Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence
under both Bush and Obama, lamented the dearth of funding for soft power, claiming
that “America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically
undermanned  and  underfunded  for  far  too  long,  relative  to  what  we  spend  on  the
military.” The result, he noted, has been the “creeping militarization of some aspects of
America's  foreign  policy…over  the  long  term,  we  cannot  kill  or  capture  our  way  to
victory.”36 
 
IV. Barack Obama and the Revitalization of America’s
Soft Power
21 The Bush Administration left office with domestic poll ratings at an all-time low, and with
much of the rest of the world clamoring for the election of a junior Senator from Illinois.
Part of the allure of Obama for international audiences was his seeming embrace of soft
power,  and a  desire  to  reestablish  America’s  moral  credibility.  During  the  campaign
Obama pledged to “restore our moral standing so that America is once again that last best
hope  for  all  who  are  called  to  the  cause  of  freedom…”37 Such  lofty  rhetoric  was
predictable as Obama sought to paint himself  as the candidate of change,  but it  also
reflected America’s declining international standing. In a September 2008 Pew survey,
seven-in-ten voters said America was less respected than in the past, while almost half
(48%) said they regarded that as a major problem. Majorities in 19 of the 24 countries in
the survey had little or no confidence in President Bush, including Britain, Germany,
France and Spain. 81% of Britain’s claimed to have little or no confidence in Bush, a figure
that rose to 88% in Spain, while in the Middle East, the figures rose even higher, to 89% in
Turkey and Jordan. The survey also found a widespread belief that US foreign policy
would “change for the better” after the inauguration of a new US president, with large
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majorities in France (68%), Spain (67%) and Germany (64%) stating the believed that US
foreign policy would improve after the election.38
22 By  campaigning  on  a  platform  of  change  that  emphasized  the  desire  to  rebuild
America’s  international  credibility,  and  engage  in  constructive  diplomacy  and
negotiation with America’s adversaries, Obama raised hopes that the tensions, disputes
and crises that plagued America’s regional and bilateral relationships during the Bush
years would be a thing of the past.  Obama made clear his intentions by surrounding
himself  with  former  Clinton-era  advisers,  schooled  in  the  art of  diplomacy  and
negotiation. Obama appointed former chief negotiator in Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke, as
special  envoy  for  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan,  and  Clinton’s  former  Middle  East  peace
envoy,  Dennis  Ross,  as  special  envoy  to  Iran  and  adviser  on  the  Middle  East.  More
controversially, Obama appointed the hawkish Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, while
he retained Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. Both Clinton and Vice-President Joe
Biden were supporters of the war in Iraq, while other appointments have included former
Bush-era officials, including John Brennan as Obama’s chief counter-terrorism advisor.
The composition of Obama’s foreign policy team led some critics to question how far the
new president would depart from his predecessor. Inderjeet Parmar described Obama as
one of a number of Democratic “presidents who cosy up to militarists in the hope of
gaining public credibility,” suggesting if Obama was serious about change, he would not
have appointed an administration that “could fairly be labelled a hybrid Bush-Clinton
third term.”39 Such appointments, however, reflected a pragmatic realisation on the part
of the inexperienced Obama that in inheriting two major conflicts and a world of growing
instability, he required a foreign policy team with experience and a degree of continuity
from the previous administration. 
23 Moreover, the first few months of Obama’s presidency suggested that the “change”
Obama pledged to deliver during the campaign was less about the foreign policy team he
assembled, and far more about the approach to foreign policy he would adopt. Such an
approach derived from a view of the world far removed from that of George W. Bush,
what Carl Pedersen identifies as a “rooted cosmopolitanism,” that centered on his “dual
identity as an American citizen and a citizen of the world.”40 Unlike the closed world-view
of his predecessor, Obama’s upbringing in Hawaii and Indonesia, his African heritage and
the influence of his mother – who had worked on development and microfinance projects
in Indonesia – gave him an insight and understanding of the world far more profound
than anything gained from the official  visits  that  his  rivals  boasted of.  A student  of
multiculturalism, and the Civil Rights and anti-apartheid movements, as a young man
Obama developed a “sensitivity to the potential disconnect between US rhetoric and US
actions” that has informed his foreign policy.41 In this  respect,  Obama is  the natural
proponent of Nye’s soft power approach, an individual who understands Nye’s belief that
how others see America does matter, because negative perceptions and views “undercut
soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to achieve its goals without resorting
to coercion or payment.”42 For Obama – as for Nye – soft power is not about winning
popularity, but about enabling the US to obtain the outcomes it wants, garnering respect
and winning the trust of those it needs to help it achieve its outcomes. 
24 Obama proclaimed in his inaugural address that “we reject as false the choice between
our safety and our ideals,”  and from the outset  sought to distance himself  from the
policies and approach pursued by the Bush Administration. Upon taking office, he issued
four executive orders: suspending the military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay and pledging
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to close the facility within a year; outlawing torture; ordering the closure of the CIA’s
secret prisons; and ordering a review of detention policies. The inflammatory language of
the “War on Terror” was dropped and Obama ordered the release of the “torture memos,”
four memoranda written by the Office of Legal Counsel between 2002-2005, detailing the
Bush  Administration’s  attempts  to  construct  a  legal  framework  for  its  controversial
detention methods. Obama purposefully sought to undo some of the damage he believed
his predecessor had wrought by reaching out to the Arab world in his landmark speech in
Cairo in which he proclaimed a “new beginning between the United States and Muslims
around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect...There must be a
sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another;
and to seek common ground.”43
25 Obama’s approach to foreign policy has been described by some as “psychological
realism,” an 
intuitive understanding that the United States was unable to impose its
own moral and historical narrative on the rest of the world. Obama asserted
the American narrative and was unabashedly proud of it; he was an authentic
American nationalist. But he did not imagine that he could make progress with
the rest of the world dependent on the world sharing that narrative.44
26 A pragmatic realist he may be, but Obama has also displayed breathtaking idealism in
demonstrating that America is “ready to lead once more.” In a speech in Prague in April
2009 Obama outlined his ambitious goal of “a world free of nuclear weapons,” committing
to specific policy departures including the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty,  the  strengthening  of  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  and  the  downgrading  of
nuclear weapons in US national security. It was for such vision that Obama was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize. The prize was an awkward moment for a President in office for less
than a year and was premature, only adding to the weight of expectations on already
burdened shoulders. Obama’s acceptance speech also captured the dilemma at the heart
of his foreign policy, as he acknowledged the challenges of balancing soft power impulses
with the requirements of national security: 
I am the Commander-in-Chief of the military of a nation in the midst
of two wars … I'm responsible for the deployment of thousands of young
Americans to battle in a distant land...And so I come here with an acute
sense of the costs of armed conflict – filled with difficult questions about
the relationship between war and peace,  and our effort to replace one
with the other.45
 
V. A Soft Power President in a Hard Power World?
27 It is Obama’s policy towards the war in Afghanistan that has most called into question his
soft  power  credentials.  His  decision  to  increase  the  US  presence  by  committing  an
additional 35,000 troops in December 2009 seemed to undermine his parallel efforts to
reshape the narrative of US foreign policy. Moreover, his decision to increase predator
drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan initiated by Bush sent further mixed messages
to those he was trying to persuade and co-opt. Obama has been described as Bush-lite, a
president who might talk the language of soft power but who often resorts to hard power
solutions. According to Lynch and Singh, “Obama is tacking rapidly and strongly to the
basic bipartisan foreign policy consensus in America. Much as he seems to evoke John F.
Kennedy rather than Jimmy Carter in his approach, he increasingly resembles a Cold War
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style Democratic hawk.”46 Afghanistan has exposed the central dilemma Obama faces:
how to balance his own soft power impulses and world-view with the realities of the
world he inherited. As he noted in Oslo: 
I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to
the American people … Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to
lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not
a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man
and the limits of reason.47
28 On  the  face  of  it,  Obama’s  decision  to  increase  US  troop  levels  in  Afghanistan  and
predator drone strikes in Pakistan suggest he is less wedded to notions of soft power than
he  has  proclaimed.  Yet  Obama  did  not  believe  that  an  immediate  withdrawal  from
Afghanistan was an option he could consider, given the policies and strategy set in place
by his predecessor. And unlike his predecessor, Obama recognized that while some level
of force was necessary, America’s efforts in Afghanistan needed to centre around a more
focused  and  politically-oriented  counter-terrrorist  operation,  rather  than  a  fully-
resourced  COIN  campaign.  Absent  from Obama’s  rhetoric  were  grandiose  notions  of
democratizing the Middle East, and in their place a more thoughtful and nuanced attempt
to recalibrate US strategy in the region. Although Obama was criticized for taking months
to deliberate over the administration’s strategy for Afghanistan, Obama took the time to
ask the searching questions Bush had failed to ask: Do we need to defeat the Taliban? Is a
COIN strategy in Afghanistan the best way to defend US national security?48 Obama was
adamant in his belief that an open-ended perpetual commitment in Afghanistan would
only serve to reinforce the notion of a US occupation.49  Obama has also been conscious of
the need to treat America’s NATO allies with greater respect than his predecessor; when
General David Petraeus informed Obama he would rather have an extra 10,000 US, instead
of  NATO  troops,  the  president  was  quick  to  remind  him  to  “Be  careful  how  you
characterise our NATO allies. We need them. They will be useful in this coalition.”50
29 In early 2009 the new administration made a concerted effort to reach out to NATO,
rejecting  the  Bush-era  habit  of  berating  allies  for  failing  to  contribute  more  troops,
instead  asking  Europeans  to  focus  on  what  they  could  do,  increasing  funding  and
resources  for  civilian reconstruction.  Jeremy Shapiro,  a  State  Department  adviser  on
Europe, commented that that “the tone of the messages he is giving is a specific and
intended sharp break with the past.”51In February 2009, Vice-President Joe Biden gave a
speech to the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy in which he made clear the
“new tone” that the Obama Administration intended to set in its relations with Europe.
However, Biden also made clear that in return for the new tone and approach of the
Obama administration, the US would expect more from its partners.52By the time NATO’s
60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg drew to a close, Obama had managed to extract
promises of troops, military trainers and civilian experts from America’s European allies
in what The Washington Post called a “sweeping demonstration of support for the new
administration's  leadership.”53 French President  Nicholas  Sarkozy  welcomed the  new
approach,  commenting  “It  feels  really  good  to  work  with  a  U.S.  president  ...  who
understands that the world doesn't boil down to simply American frontiers and borders.”
54 
30 At heart then, Obama is a pragmatic realist,  deeply ambitious and determined to
reconfigure America’s role in the world yet imbued with an astute awareness that the
world in which he operates will sometimes require uncomfortable choices. It is not only
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the war in Afghanistan that has exposed the dilemmas Obama faces. On a range of issues,
from climate change to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the challenges posed by
Iran and North Korea, Obama has often found himself having to compromise. Obama’s
Cairo speech was a clear attempt to rebuild America’s soft power in the Middle East, but
continuing support for the corrupt regime of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan despite the
fraudulent elections – viewed as a necessary evil in Washington – and the failure to close
Guantanamo Bay remain points of contention for many in the Arab world. The killing of
Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, although a huge boost for the president domestically, was
regarded by Pakistan as a unacceptable violation of Pakistani sovereignty, while even in
the West questions have been raised as to why the President ‘executed’ Bin Laden, instead
of bringing him to trial.55 Despite seeming to demonstrate a commitment to a more even-
handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, the early resistance of Benyamin
Netanyahu  to  Obama’s  demands  for  an  end  to  the  construction  of  illegal  Israeli
settlements in East Jerusalem left Obama looking powerless – and subject to criticism that
he had failed to exert sufficient pressure on Netanyahu, and done little to help alleviate
the humanitarian situation in Gaza.”56 Moreover, although Obama has engaged with the
peace process from the very start of his presidency, based upon the premise that progress
on  the  Israeli-Palestinian  front  is  linked  to  securing  Arab  support  on  the  equally
challenging question of Iran, the release of the ‘Palestine Papers’ in January 2011 only
served to expose the degree of disappointment with Obama felt by many Palestinians. The
papers reveal the dismay at Obama’s ‘capitulation’ on the settlement issue, continuing
perceptions of the US position as ‘pro-Israeli’ and the administration’s rejection of its
predecessors commitment to using the 1967 borders as a baseline for negotiations.57 In a
speech in Washington in May 2011 Obama sought to reclaim the initiative by stating that
Israeli  and Palestinian borders  should be  based on the 1967 lines,  a  move met  with
hostility from the visiting Netanyahu, at the same time as he urged the Palestinians not to
got  to  the  UN  to  seek  recognition  for  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  and  Jerusalem  as  an
independent state.58 Like his predecessors,  Obama remains constrained by a powerful
domestic Jewish lobby and America’s historic links with Israel, but his sustained effort to
maintain the pressure on Netanyahu suggests a president determined to chart a more
balanced path. 
31 On  Iran,  although  Obama  has  demonstrated  a  more  principled  commitment  to
‘constructive  engagement,’  the  political  turmoil  surrounding  the  Iranian  elections
exposed,  again,  the limits of  Obama’s soft  power approach.  On the one hand,  Obama
needed  to  grasp  the  opportunity  presented  by  the  groundswell  of  anti-Ahmedinijad
sentiment and the reformist movement, but his response was notably cautious, reluctant
to be seen as “meddling” in Iran’s political affairs given the desire to engage the regime
on  nuclear  proliferation.  Obama’s  response  was  further  evidence  of  his  instinctive
pragmatism and the administration’s commitment to ‘smart’ power, a willingness to take
each  case  on  its  merits  and  consider  the  appropriate  mix  of  hard  and  soft  power.
Elsewhere, Obama’s efforts to forge a new relationship with China have succumbed to the
usual pressures, with disputes over Taiwan, exchange rates, human rights and internet
censorship,  the  Chinese  going  so  far  as  to  accuse  the  Americans  of  “information
imperialism.”59 Despite being accused of “soft-peddling” the Chinese on human rights,
Obama has opted for a strategy of quiet engagement, with human rights talks taking place
behind closed doors, as he attempts to balance criticism of China’s human rights record
with the desire for a cooperative relationship on key global issues like climate change. 
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32 US-Sino  relations  will  likely  remain  a  difficult  challenge  in  balancing  competing
tensions. As one analyst has noted such challenges “cannot be charmed out of existence.”
60 To suggest  that  Obama thought  he could “charm” such issues  out  of existence is,
however, missing the point. By putting soft power at the centre rather than the margins
of US foreign policy, Obama has gone a long way towards reconfiguring America’s image
in the world – in a remarkably short space of time. As Zbigniew Bzrezinski argued in early
2010: 
Obama  has  undertaken  a  truly  ambitious  effort  to  redefine  the  United
States”  view  of  the  world  and  to  reconnect  the  United  States  with  the
emerging  historical  context  of  the  twenty-first  century.  He  has  done  this
remarkably well. In less than a year, he has comprehensively reconceptualized
U.S. foreign policy.61
33 Signs are also beginning to emerge that Obama’s softer touches are beginning to pay
dividends, particularly as Obama benefits from the momentum generated by domestic
successes, notably healthcare reform, allowing him to focus on key foreign policy issues
that have often seemed to take a back-seat to domestic concerns. Climate change was one
such issue, but even despite the pressing domestic challenges Obama faced, he played a
crucial role in helping facilitate negotiations with the Chinese and Indians behind the
scenes at Copenhagen. Although those negotiations delivered a non-binding agreement
that fell far short of what many had hoped for, the challenges of getting a comprehensive,
binding agreement were always going to exceed the persuasive powers of one individual. 
34 More notably, a year on from his landmark speech in Prague, Obama and Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev signed the START III agreement committing both countries
to reducing their nuclear arsenals by a third, and affirming a shared determination to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Obama generated leverage with Russia in
abandoning Bush-era plans for a missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic
that had led to a deep rift in relations, and developing a new plan focused on the threat of
short-range missiles from Iran. Crucially, the improved relationship with Russia is now
beginning to facilitate cooperation on Iran, with the Russians supporting tough new UN
sanctions.  The renewed emphasis on diplomacy and the “reset” of US-Russian relations
has generated real and tangible gains, representing a notable shift away from the often
inflammatory rhetoric and terse exchanges that characterised the relationship during the
Bush-era.
 
VI. Smart Power: ‘The world we’re trying to build’
35 Iran is an issue that epitomizes the administration’s increasing embrace of “smart
power,” the integration of soft and hard power that Hillary Clinton championed at her
Senate confirmation hearings. According to Clinton smart power has diplomacy at its
vanguard, but seeks to use “the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic,
military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for
each situation.”62 The term was first coined by Suzanne Nossel in an article for Foreign
Affairs in 2004, but has only recently become part of the US foreign policy lexicon, thanks
in part to Clinton. However, the term was also picked up by Joseph Nye. In 2006, Nye
established a bipartisan Commission on Smart Power with former Bush deputy Secretary
of State, Richard Armitage. Although acknowledging that “America should have higher
ambitions than being popular” it asserted that 
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foreign opinion matters to U.S. decisionmaking. A good reputation fosters
goodwill and brings acceptance for unpopular ventures. Helping other nations
and  individuals  achieve  their  aspirations  is  the  best  way  to  strengthen
America’s reputation abroad. This approach will require a shift in how the U.S.
government thinks about security.63
36 Many of its recommendations – restoring alliances and partnerships,  an emphasis on
global development, investing in global public goods and public diplomacy – have been
evident in Obama’s foreign policy. Obama has demonstrated a renewed commitment to
both the UN and NATO, announcing a “new era of engagement” in America’s relations
with the UN, after the troubled relationship of the Bush years. Obama appointed Susan
Rice as Ambassador to the UN, restoring the post to cabinet level and paying over $2
billion the US owed in UN dues. 
37 The Obama administration has also demonstrated a commitment to reinvigorating US
public diplomacy as a central component of America’s soft power. Obama and Clinton
have built upon the Public Diplomacy 2.0. programme begun by the Bush Administration
with a  number of  initiatives  pioneered by a  new generation of  technologically-savvy
“whizz-kids”  in  the  State  Department.  The  State  Department’s  technology-enabled
approach to diplomacy has seen Obama's speeches and online “tweets” translated into
dozens of  languages,  alongside efforts  to “wire up” more remote parts  of  the world.
Obama’s Cairo speech was a classic example of how the administration is using social
media technologies to promote its message and construct an alternative narrative to that
offered by groups like Al-Qaeda. The speech was instantaneously wired around the world,
via social networking sites, podcasts, and a live Webcast on the White House’s Web site.
Updates via text message reached 20,000 non-US citizens in over 200 countries around
the world, with the texts being available in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and eight other languages.
In addition, translated versions of the speech were available to download on YouTube,
Facebook, and MySpace, and the South Asian social networking site Orkut. The White
House  used  Facebook  to  conduct  an  international  discussion  on  the  event,  while
responses to the speech submitted via text messages were compiled and later posted on
America.gov.  The Obama Administration has breathed new life into public diplomacy
initiatives,  and  accorded  it  a  far  higher  priority  than  the  Bush  Administration.  R.S.
Zaharna has  noted “the energy and sense of  purpose in the way the administration
appears to be reaching out to the international community in general and the Muslim
world in  particular.  The focus  on listening and engagement  is  pronounced as  is  the
deliberate effort to communicate respect and understanding. The rhetoric is less shrill,
less  demanding  and  less  confrontational.  Metaphorically,  the  image  of  U.S.  public
diplomacy is one of open hands rather than clenched fists.”64 
38 The problem for Obama remains the same, however: ensuring that words are matched
by deeds and that US policy and actions are not at odds with the messages being crafted.
To that end, the US under Obama has achieved a better balance than under Bush, but
there remain policies, including the use of force in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
failure  to  close  Guantanamo,  that  continue  to  undermine  the  image  of  America  the
administration is trying to disseminate. It is the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings, however, that
have most exposed the contradictions at the heart of the administration’s approach. In
his Cairo speech, Obama was at pains to emphasise his “commitment…to governments
that reflect the will of the people.” Although arguing that ‘America does not presume to
know what is best for everyone…’ Obama affirmed his
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unyielding belief  that  all  people  yearn for  certain  things:  the  ability  to
speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the
rule  of  law  and  the  equal  administration  of  justice;  government  that  is
transparent  and  doesn't  steal  from the  people;  the  freedom to  live  as  you
choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is
why we will support them everywhere.65
39 Given such “unyielding beliefs,” it is not surprising that the administration’s calls for an
‘orderly transition’ following the toppling of President Mubarak disappointed many; the
British journalist and veteran Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk was scathing in his
condemnation  of  an  administration  that  had  put  the  “national  interest”  before  its
proclaimed moral values, arguing that “One of the blights of history will now involve a
U.S. president who held out his hand to the Islamic world and then clenched his fist when
it  fought  a  dictatorship and demanded democracy.”66Obama took the middle-ground,
wanting to support the pro-democracy movement, without undermining America’s long-
term strategic interests.  Pragmatism, it  seemed,  had again trumped principle.  Others
lambasted Obama for  acquiescing in  “the  triumph of  militant  Islam in  places  whose
regimes  heretofore  lent  themselves,  at  least  occasionally,  to  furthering  Western
interests.”67 As  Ryan  Lizza  observes,  the protests  in  Egypt  exposed  the  “inherent
contradictions of an Administration trying to simultaneously encourage and contain the
forces of revolution,” with Obama himself uneasy at his own “cool detachment” from the
“people.”68 Yet  Obama’s  response  was  not  as  contradictory  as  might  be  thought;  his
instinct was to support the protestors demands for democracy and freedom, at the same
time as  ensuring  the  country  was  carefully  “steered”  towards  a  genuine  democratic
transformation,  mindful  of  the  perils  of  the  US  once  again  leading  a  charge  for
democracy.  Obama  neither  wanted  America’s  footprints  stamped  over  Mubarak’s
departure given events in Iraq, nor did he want to see the Muslim Brotherhood fill a
power vacuum that would threaten to undermine the rights sought by the protestors – or
US strategic  interests.  His  approach was one of  forceful  persuasion,  privately  calling
Mubarak to explore the prospects for an orderly transition, before publicly calling on that
transition to ‘begin now.’  
40 It is an approach that has been described as anti-ideological “consequentialism,”69 and
it was again on display as the Obama Administration debated what course of action to
take in Libya, a crisis that has exposed even more sharply the schisms at the heart of the
administration. On the one hand “Obama’s Women of War,” liberal interventionists such
as Samantha Power, Susan Rice, Gayle Smith and Hillary Clinton, purportedly pushed the
president  to  intervene  in  Libya,  in  the  face  of  opposition  from predominantly  male
Realists,  such  as  Defense  Secretary  Robert  Gates.70  Clinton  and  Power  in  particular
pushed the president to take a smart power approach, using soft power to isolate Qadaffi
diplomatically, while to help remove Libya from its seat on the UN Security Council. As
the administration debated military options, the perception grew that the UK and France
were dragging Obama into the conflict,  but  accounts  of  the decision-making process
reveal an administration, once again, carefully weighing up its options, conscious of how
its actions might be perceived in the Arab world, and a determination to work through
the UN and Arab League. Hillary Clinton justified the US response in stating that 
we’re going to see whether the Security Council will support the Arab
League.  Not  support  the  United  States  –  support  the  Arab  League…for
those who want to see the United States always acting unilaterally, it’s not
satisfying. But, for the world we’re trying to build, where we have a lot of
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responsible actors who are willing to step up and lead, it is exactly what
we should be doing.71
41 For critics of Obama, his “consequentialist” approach to foreign policy, one that sees him
approach each case on its merits weighing up the evidence on both sides in a manner
befitting a lawyer, is precisely the problem. Obama appears something of a paradox: a
president  who  seems  to  embrace  soft  power,  but  has  increased  the  US  military
commitment in Afghanistan; who has proclaimed a new era of constructive engagement
with Iran, only at times to revert to Bush-era hard-line rhetoric; who has pledged to close
Guantanamo, but failed to do so;  who speaks out in support of democracy, freedom and
human rights,  but  deliberates  at  length over whether to support  protest  movements
demanding those very rights; who proclaims America as the “last, best, hope on earth,” at
the same time that he speaks of the limits to American power.  
42 For some, Obama’s policy toward issues such as Iran or the Arab protests is not smart
but simply “bad logic.” For Mark Levine, “Refusing to support the region's pro-democracy
movements is neither particularly respectful, nor does it represent a lack of interference.
It is a form of action - powerfully so - in favour of the status quo. And most everyone in
the region understands it as such.”72 Thus, Obama’s instinctive pragmatism pushes him
towards a middle ground where he is seen as lacking the courage of his convictions.  Left-
wing critics have been withering in their condemnation of a president who promised
‘change’ in US foreign policy but who, they argue, has thus far failed to deviate from the
norms governing US policy for much of its modern history: global hegemony, militarism,
and imperialism. Tariq Ali is scathing in his critique of Obama’s speeches in Cairo, Prague,
Oslo and elsewhere, regarding them as filled with “sonorous banality and armor-plated
hypocrisy”,  with Obama described as  a  “hand-me-down version” of  the “imperialist”
Woodrow Wilson, promising peace but delivering war.73  For Tariq Ali, Noam Chomsky,
Jon Pilger and others, Obama is as much a part of the US imperial project as Bush was,
with shifts in style and approach counting for little.74 Such criticisms are not without
foundation; a TomDispatch analysis of Pentagon documents has revealed that “the Obama
administration has sought to send billions of dollars in weapons systems -- from advanced
helicopters to fighter jets -- to the very regimes that have beaten, jailed, and killed pro-
democracy demonstrators, journalists, and reform activists throughout the Arab Spring.”
75 Arms sales such as these – long a feature of US foreign policy – do much to undermine
any notion that Obama is a ‘soft’ power president, and further reinforce the arguments of
those like Bacevich who maintains that Obama remains as blind as his predecessors as to
the folly of deploying US military force in the Greater Middle East.76
43 Yet critics of Obama perhaps fail to understand that the complexity and pragmatism
that appears to lie at the heart of his foreign policy, although not always appreciated by
the  public  and  political  commentators,  is  arguably  one  of  the  president’s  strengths.
Obama appears to have an astute ability to see the world not in narrow black-and-white,
good v. evil terms, but in the shades of gray he finds it. A blanket policy of intervention in
support of pro-democracy movements may not always be the right choice to make, even
if it morally seems the right thing to do; nor does ruling out ‘liberal interventionism’ on
the grounds that it fuels resentment towards the US or drags the US into conflicts in
which its vital interests are not at stake. In his May 2011 speech on the turmoil in the
Middle East, Obama sought to respond to his critics by once again affirming America’s
support for democratic movements, but reminding his audience that America had to act
with “humility” after its actions in Iraq. Soft power was, however, at the heart of Obama’s
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speech.  Justifying  military  action in  Libya,  but  not  elsewhere,  on the  grounds  of  an
“imminent massacre” and the scale of the violence, he acknowledged the violence and
repression in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen claiming that
America must use all our influence to encourage reform in the region.
Even as we acknowledge that each country is different, we will need to
speak honestly about the principles that we believe in, with friend and foe
alike. Our message is simple: if you take the risks that reform entails, you
will have the full support of the United States. We must also build on our
efforts to broaden our engagement beyond elites,  so that we reach the
people who will shape the future – particularly young people… We will
continue to make good on the commitments that I  made in Cairo – to
build networks of entrepreneurs, and expand exchanges in education; to
foster cooperation in science and technology, and combat disease. Across
the  region,  we  intend  to  provide  assistance  to  civil  society,  including
those that may not be officially sanctioned, and who speak uncomfortable
truths. And we will use the technology to connect with – and listen to –
the voices of the people. In fact, real reform will not come at the ballot
box  alone.  Through our  efforts  we  must  support  those  basic  rights  to
speak your mind and access information. We will support open access to
the Internet, and the right of journalists to be heard – whether it's a big
news organization or a blogger. In the 21st century, information is power;
the  truth  cannot  be  hidden;  and  the  legitimacy  of  governments  will
ultimately depend on active and informed citizens.77
44 Abandoning decades of  US arms sales to unsavoury regimes may do more to bolster
America’s global image than any single speech, and Obama may lack the bold leadership
and courage of his convictions to deliver genuine change, but the more nuanced, studious
and pragmatic leadership he has thus far provided does promise to chart a more balanced
path through what are desperately turbulent times. As one adviser to Obama is reported
to have commented, the administration’s emphasis on “stealth and modesty” is “so at
odds with the John Wayne expectation for  what  America is  in the world ….  But  it’s
necessary for shepherding us through this phrase.”78
45 The world Obama inhabits does not lend itself easily to soft power approaches, and
the president himself has been forced to confront such a reality, with events such as the
suspected terrorist attack on the inauguration and the Christmas Day bombing serving as
powerful reminders of the dominant paradigm for US foreign policy that he inherited –
the seemingly omnipresent threat from international terrorism. Yet, the fact that soft
power has to sometimes sit alongside hard power, or that others might not respond in the
manner in which Obama hoped, does not diminish its significance or utility. If there is an
emerging Obama doctrine then it appears to be centered on the complexities of the world
America inhabits, the “burdens of global citizenship” in an interconnected world and the
necessities  of  partnership and cooperation.  As  Ryan Lizza notes,  “the one consistent
thread running  through most  of  Obama’s  decisions  has  been that  America  must  act
humbly in the world,”79 Whatever an Obama “doctrine” might be, it seems clear that soft
power is at the very heart of Obama’s foreign policy world. The president may not be
dogmatically wedded to it, nor apply it consistently, but a genuine appreciation that the
United States needs to better incorporate soft power practices and principles into its
foreign policy is undoubtedly present in this administration. Obama has done more than
any previous president to elevate the concept to the centre, not the periphery, of US
foreign policy, but his administration is also testimony to the fact that the US has now
moved beyond the hard power/soft power debate. The emergence of “smart power” as a
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concept in US foreign policy reflects an acceptance that soft power has a central role to
play in US foreign policy and an appreciation of its virtues and merits, alongside a hard-
headed recognition that it is not the answer to all America’s ills, and must not only be
carefully  applied and leveraged,  but  combined with other  levers  of  US power where
necessary. 
 
VII. Conclusion
46 Much has changed since John Quincy Adams asserted in 1821 that the United States “goes
not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”80 Active US global leadership has been
instrumental in dealing with some of the foremost threats to international peace and
security in the modern era.  Previous administrations and presidents have not always
acted  in  a  manner  that  commands  respect  and  credibility  abroad,  but  the  Bush
Administration’s neglect and squandering of America’s soft power did much to erode
America’s  international  legitimacy and credibility.  Far  from commending,  in Adams’s
words, “the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy
of her example,”81 the Bush Administration’s conduct of the War on Terror served to fuel
anti-American sentiment and undermine its own aims and objectives. To caricature Bush
as a hard power president and Obama as a soft power would be false, however. Bush’s
preference  for  hard  power  was  evident  from the  beginning  of  his  administration,  a
natural instinct for a group of individuals who believed overwhelmingly in the power of
the American military to  deliver  their  policy  goals  and objectives.  Yet  there  was  an
attempt to recoup some of the damage done during the administration’s first term in its
second, with the administration reaching out to allies, committing itself to diplomacy and
negotiation on issues such as Iran and North Korea, and attempting – though somewhat
belatedly – to revitalise its public diplomacy. 
47 While  Obama may be  a  soft  power  president  at  heart,  he  is  also  a  pragmatist,  a
“smart” president, intuitively aware of the hard power world in which he operates and
which does, often, constrain his policy choices. As Obama has acknowledged: “When you
start applying blanket policies on the complexities of the current world situation, you’re
going to get yourself into trouble.”82  Obama himself is a far more complex figure than his
predecessor. The changes in Bush’s foreign policy could not mask his unshakeable belief
in American global hegemony, and a Manichean view of the world divided into “good”
and “evil.” Although Obama does indeed share with Bush a fundamental commitment to
American exceptionalism, he does not view the world in such narrow terms, nor does he
believe American values can be imposed upon other cultures and societies, or that the US
can  exhibit  disdain  for  international  institutions  and  allies  without  suffering  the
consequences. Obama is also acutely aware of the limits of American power. During the
campaign Obama was seen carrying a copy of Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World, a
book that charts the “rise of the rest” and an end to the “unipolar moment” famously
trumpeted by Krauthammer in 1990.83
48 Unlike his predecessor, Obama does not seek to defend and promote an assertive US
global  hegemony  predicated  on  America’s  unrivalled  military  dominance.  Obama
acknowledged in his inauguration address that “the world has changed” and that claims
to American global leadership are often counter-productive. The “post-American” world
is one in which there are significant constraints on the exercises of American power,
some of them caused by his predecessor, others that are more structural and rooted in
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changes  to  world  order.  US  influence  in  the  world  has  declined,  in  part because  of
growing anti-Americanism and resentment at American policies over the eight years of
the Bush Administration, but also because America is no longer the behemoth it once was.
As  Barry  Buzan  notes,  not  only  has  America’s  capacity  for  global  leadership  been
weakened  by  the  rise  of  emerging  powers  such  as  China,  India  and  Brazil  and  the
economic  crisis  Obama  inherited,  but  also  because  “there  is  a  general  turn  within
international society against hegemony and therefore against the global leadership role
itself.” The challenge for the US then is that it has “to learn to live in a more pluralist
international  society where it  is  no longer  the sole  superpower but  merely the first
among equals.”84  Just over a year on from his election, it would seem Obama is neither
the aggressive advocate of US hegemony of his predecessor, but nor has he discarded
claims to US global leadership. Rather, he accepts the limits to American power and seeks
to return to an ideal of US exceptionalism in which the US is an exemplar state, leading
by example, but which also looks to others to share the burdens of global leadership. He
does  not  reject  US  exceptionalism  –  but  in  many  ways  he  seeks  to  move  beyond
interpretations of it that have became deeply entrenched in the US political psyche. As he
proclaimed in his inauguration address America was “ready to lead once more”; gone
would be the crusading hegemon of the Bush years, and in its place would emerge a more
tolerant, respectful and humble nation, a nation whose “power grows through its prudent
use,” whose “security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example,
the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”85
49 The early signs are that  Obama’s  reinvigoration of  US soft  power is  beginning to
deliver tangible rewards.  The early “failures” of  the Obama administration are being
replaced with successes – some tentative, others more notable, including START III and
moves  towards  nuclear  disarmament.  Whether  Obama’s  powers  of  persuasion  will
succeed in kick-starting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process back into life remain to be
seen – and many daunting obstacles remain to the two-state solution the US still prefers.
Relations with the UN and NATO have improved with the administration demonstrating a
firm commitment to both, while the Pew Global Attitudes Project has observed that since
2008 “the image of the United States has improved markedly in most parts of the world,
reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama.”86
50 The task for Obama remains daunting, however, a reality that was starkly reinforced
when  Obama’s  Undersecretary  for  Public  Diplomacy  Judith  McHale  sat  down  with  a
Pakistani journalist in a hotel in Karachi in August 2009, as part of Obama’s strategy to
convince the people of Pakistan the US is “their friend.” Following a presentation by
McHale  on  building  bridges  between  America  and  the  Muslim  world,  the  Pakistani
journalist is reported to have responded: “You should know that we hate all Americans.
From the  bottom of  our  souls,  we  hate  you.”87 Indeed,  for  all  the  reinvigoration  of
America’s soft power under Obama, there are enormous structural obstacles that remain.
America’s normative authority was undermined by the Bush Administration to the point
where reestablishing US credibility and legitimacy is likely to take a number of years.
Constrained by the realities of the world he inherited, Obama is also pursuing policies
that sit uncomfortably with efforts to “rebrand” America, while resistance to US global
leadership  is  hard-wired  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  the  product  of  decades  of  US
dominance.  Time will  tell  as  to  whether  Obama is  able  to  overcome such structural
impediments. Following a rapturously received speech to the British Parliament in May
2011,  Obama was told “You are an idealist,  and it’s an idealism that serves nations.”
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Obama’s response was short, and to the point: “Thank you very much. That’s what I try to
do.”88 Obama’s idealism and soft power instincts can be both a blessing and a curse, but as
Obama approaches the mid-way point of his first term in office, he should be credited for
not only having put soft power at the centre of US foreign policy, but also demonstrating
a genuine – if sometimes imperfect – commitment to leading by example.’
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